Chapter III
Of Mixed Principalities
But it is in the new principality that difficulties arise. First, if it is not entirely new but is like a member added on, so that the whole together may be called mixed, its changes arise above all from a natural difficulty that exists in all new principalities: men willingly change their ruler, believing they will better themselves, and this belief makes them take up arms against the one who rules; in which they are deceived, for they afterwards see by experience that they have made things worse. This depends on another natural and ordinary necessity, which means that one must always offend those over whom one becomes the new prince, both with men-at-arms and with countless other injuries that the new acquisition brings in its train. Thus you find that you have as enemies all those whom you have offended in seizing that principality, and you cannot keep as friends those who put you there, since you cannot satisfy them in the way they had expected, nor can you use strong medicine against them, being obliged to them; for however powerful one's armies may be, one always needs the favour of the inhabitants to enter a province. For these reasons Louis XII, king of France, quickly occupied Milan and quickly lost it; and the first time Ludovico's own forces were enough to take it from him, because the people who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes and in the future benefits they had expected, could not bear the vexations of the new prince. It is true that when rebellious lands are conquered a second time, they are lost with greater difficulty; for the ruler, taking occasion from the rebellion, is less hesitant to make himself secure by punishing the offenders, uncovering the suspects and strengthening himself in his weakest places. So that if, the first time, a Duke Ludovico making a stir on the borders was enough to make France lose Milan, to make her lose it the second time the whole world had to be against her and her armies destroyed and driven out of Italy; which arose from the causes mentioned above. Nevertheless, both the first and the second time it was taken from her. The general causes of the first loss have been discussed; it remains now to see those of the second, and to say what remedies the king had, and what remedies someone in his position might have, to hold on to his acquisition better than the king of France did. I say, therefore, that the states which, when acquired, are added to an old state of the one who acquires them, are either of the same province and the same language, or they are not. When they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are not used to living in freedom; and to possess them securely it is enough to have extinguished the line of the prince who ruled them. For in other things, if their old conditions are maintained and there is no difference in customs, men live quietly, as we have seen in Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony and Normandy, which have been joined to France for so long; and although there is some difference in language, the customs are similar and they can easily get along together. Whoever acquires such states and wishes to hold them must have two concerns: first, that the line of their former prince be extinguished; second, that he alter neither their laws nor their taxes; so that in a very short time they become one body with his ancient principality. But when states are acquired in a province differing in language, customs and institutions, here the difficulties begin, and here one needs great good fortune and great diligence to hold them. And one of the greatest and most effective remedies would be for the person who acquires them to go and live there.
This would make the possession more secure and more lasting, as the Turk has done with Greece; for with all the other measures he took to hold that state, he could not possibly have held it had he not gone to live there. For when one is on the spot, disorders can be seen as they arise and can quickly be remedied; when one is not, they are heard of only when they have grown great and there is no longer any remedy. Besides this, the province is not plundered by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by having ready recourse to the prince, so that they have more reason to love him if they wish to be good, and to fear him if they wish to be otherwise. Any outsider who might wish to attack that state will be more cautious; so that if the prince lives there, he can lose it only with the greatest difficulty. The other and better remedy is to send colonies to one or two places that serve as keys to that state; for it is necessary either to do this or to keep a large force of cavalry and infantry there. A prince does not spend much on colonies; he sends them and maintains them at little or no expense, and he offends only those from whom he takes fields and houses to give them to the new inhabitants, who are a very small part of that state; and those whom he offends, remaining scattered and poor, can never harm him, while all the others remain on the one hand unharmed, and are therefore easily quieted, and on the other afraid of making a mistake, lest what happened to those who were despoiled should happen to them. I conclude that these colonies cost nothing, are more faithful and give less offence, and that those who are offended, being poor and scattered, cannot do harm, as I have said. For it must be noted that men must be either caressed or crushed; for they avenge slight injuries, but cannot avenge grave ones; so the injury one does to a man must be such that one need not fear his revenge. But if a prince keeps armed men there instead of colonies, he spends far more, having to consume all the revenues of that state in guarding it, so that the acquisition turns into a loss; and he gives much more offence, because he harms the whole state by moving his army about from one billet to another. Everyone feels this hardship, and everyone becomes his enemy; and they are enemies who can harm him, since, though beaten, they remain in their own homes. In every respect, then, this kind of garrison is useless, just as colonies are useful. Further, whoever is in a province differing from his own, as has been said, must make himself the leader and defender of the less powerful neighbours, contrive to weaken the more powerful ones, and take care that by no accident does a foreigner as powerful as himself gain entry. And it will always happen that such a one is brought in by those in the province who are discontented, out of excessive ambition or out of fear; as was seen when the Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece; and in every other province the Romans entered, they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the order of things is that as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a province, all the less powerful ones in it rally to him, moved by the envy they bear towards whoever has been powerful over them; so that, as regards these lesser powers, he has no trouble at all in winning them over, for at once they all willingly make common cause with the state he has acquired there. He has only to see to it that they do not acquire too much strength and too much authority; and with his own forces and their favour he can easily bring down those who are powerful, so as to remain in every respect the arbiter of that province. And whoever does not manage this well will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it will have endless difficulties and troubles within it.
The Romans, in the provinces they took, observed these points well. They sent colonies, kept on good terms with the less powerful without increasing their power, brought down the powerful, and did not allow powerful foreigners to gain a reputation there. And I wish the province of Greece alone to suffice as an example. The Achaeans and the Aetolians were kept on good terms by them; the kingdom of the Macedonians was brought down; Antiochus was driven out. Yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never made the Romans allow them to enlarge any state, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce them to be his friends without bringing him down, nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to his holding any state in that province. For the Romans did in these cases what all wise princes must do, who must have regard not only to present troubles but to future ones, and must guard against them with every effort; for when they are foreseen from afar, they can easily be remedied, but if you wait until they are upon you, the medicine is too late, because the disease has become incurable. It happens with this as the physicians say of hectic fever,1 that at the beginning it is easy to cure and hard to diagnose, but in the course of time, if it has not been recognised and treated at the beginning, it becomes easy to diagnose and hard to cure. So it happens in affairs of state: for if the evils that arise in it are recognised from afar, which is given only to a prudent man, they are quickly healed; but when, through not being recognised, they are allowed to grow until everyone can recognise them, there is no longer any remedy. Therefore the Romans, seeing troubles from afar, always remedied them, and never let them run their course in order to avoid a war; for they knew that war is not avoided but only deferred to the advantage of others. So they chose to make war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have to fight them in Italy; and they could for the time being have avoided both, but did not wish to. Nor did they ever like what is every day on the lips of the wise men of our times — to enjoy the benefits of time — but rather the benefits of their own virtue and prudence; for time drives everything before it, and can bring with it good as well as evil, evil as well as good.
But let us return to France and examine whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I shall speak of Louis and not of Charles, as of the one whose conduct can be better seen because he held possessions in Italy longer; and you will see that he did the opposite of what must be done to hold a state in a different province. King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wished to gain half the state of Lombardy by his coming. I do not wish to blame the king for coming or for the course he took; for wishing to gain a foothold in Italy, and having no friends in this province — indeed, all doors being closed to him because of the conduct of King Charles — he was forced to accept whatever friendships he could; and his well-conceived plan would have succeeded had he not made some error in his other dealings. Having acquired Lombardy, then, the king at once regained the reputation that Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, the Lady of Forlì, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino and Piombino, the people of Lucca, Pisa and Siena — each came to meet him to be his friend. And then the Venetians could consider the rashness of the course they had taken, for, to acquire two towns in Lombardy, they made the king master of two thirds of Italy. Consider now with how little difficulty the king could have maintained his reputation in Italy had he observed the rules set out above and kept secure and defended all those friends of his, who, being numerous, weak and fearful, some of the Church, some of the Venetians, were always obliged to stay with him, and through whom he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained great. But no sooner was he in Milan than he did the opposite, giving aid to Pope Alexander so that he could occupy the Romagna. Nor did he perceive that by this decision he made himself weak, depriving himself of his friends and of those who had thrown themselves into his lap, and made the Church great, adding to its spiritual power, which gives it so much authority, so much temporal power. And having made one mistake, he was forced to follow it up, so that, to put an end to Alexander's ambition and prevent him from becoming master of Tuscany, he was forced to come into Italy. And not content with having made the Church great and deprived himself of his friends, because he wanted the kingdom of Naples he divided it with the king of Spain; and where he had been the arbiter of Italy, he brought in a partner, so that the ambitious men of that province who were discontented with him had somewhere to turn; and where he could have left in that kingdom a king who would be his pensioner, he removed him to put in one who could drive him out. It is truly a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire; and when men do so who can, they will always be praised, or at least not blamed; but when they cannot and wish to do so at all costs, here lies the blame and the error. If France, then, could have attacked Naples with her own forces, she should have done so; if she could not, she should not have divided it. And if the division of Lombardy that she made with the Venetians deserved excuse because by it she set foot in Italy, this one deserves blame because it was not excused by that necessity.
Louis, then, had made these five errors: he had destroyed the lesser powers; he had increased the power of one already powerful in Italy; he had brought in a very powerful foreigner; he had not come to live there; he had not sent colonies there. These errors, while he lived, might still not have harmed him, had he not made a sixth: taking their state from the Venetians. For had he not made the Church great nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been reasonable and necessary to bring them down; but having taken those first steps, he should never have consented to their ruin. For as long as they were powerful, they would always have kept the others away from any enterprise in Lombardy, both because the Venetians would not have consented to it without becoming its masters themselves, and because the others would not have wished to take it from France to give it to them, nor would they have had the courage to attack both. And if someone were to say that King Louis ceded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid a war, I answer, for the reasons given above, that one must never allow a disorder to continue in order to avoid a war; for war is not avoided, but only deferred to your disadvantage. And if others were to cite the pledge the king had given the pope to undertake that enterprise for him in return for the dissolution of his marriage and the cardinal's hat for Rouen,2 I answer with what I shall say below about the faith of princes and how it should be kept.
King Louis, then, lost Lombardy because he did not observe any of the conditions observed by others who have taken provinces and wished to hold them. Nor is this any miracle, but very reasonable and ordinary. And I spoke of this matter at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino — as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called — was occupying the Romagna. For when the Cardinal of Rouen told me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied that the French did not understand the state, for if they had understood it, they would not have let the Church grow so great. And experience has shown that the greatness in Italy of the Church and of Spain was caused by France, and her ruin was brought about by them. From this one draws a general rule that never or rarely fails: whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful ruins himself; for that power is brought about by him either through diligence or through force, and both of these are suspect to the one who has become powerful.